Chapter

Causation

Barry Stroud

in Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction

Published in print January 2011 | ISBN: 9780199764969
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199894970 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764969.003.0002
Causation

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This chapter argues that understanding ourselves as believing in causal connections held fully independently of us and our having the responses we do is inconsistent with accepting a negative metaphysical verdict about causation. We do regard the causal connections we believe in as independent of us in that way; no reductionist account that would eliminate the modal element is acceptable. So we cannot accept a negative metaphysical verdict about causal dependence and consistently continue to accept all the things we believe involving causal modal connections between things in the world.

Keywords: metaphysics; causation; causal connections; causal dependence; negative metaphysical verdict

Chapter.  18168 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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