Chapter

Value

Barry Stroud

in Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction

Published in print January 2011 | ISBN: 9780199764969
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199894970 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764969.003.0004
Value

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This chapter argues that attending to our evaluative judgments and practices as they actually are leaves us unable to see them all together from a position that somehow reveals their relation to an independent world in which none of them hold. The combination of the irreducibility, the indispensability, and the pervasiveness of evaluative judgments defeats the attempt to reach a completely general negative metaphysical verdict about them. What is most remarkable about this recognizable failure is how little effect it seems to have on the apparently unshakeable conviction that a negative metaphysical verdict about values in the independent world simply must be right.

Keywords: metaphysics; negative metaphysical verdict; value; independent world

Chapter.  16759 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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