Chapter

Singular Propositions<sup>*</sup>

Trenton Merricks

in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199766864
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199932184 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.003.0006
Singular Propositions*

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Let a “singular proposition” be any proposition expressed by a sentence that uses a rigid designator or directly referring term. Thus, plausibly, “Lincoln was tall” expresses a singular proposition. The received view is that singular propositions have the relevant individual (in this case, Lincoln) as a constituent, which is something like a part. I argue that the received view is false, and that singular propositions do not have the relevant individuals as constituents. I then offer my own account of singular propositions. I then reflect on what all of this means for the metaphysics of propositions in general

Keywords: proposition; singular proposition; Plantinga; names; essence; actualism; serious actualism

Chapter.  10138 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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