Chapter

Theory Comparison in Science and Religion

Richard Otte

in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199766864
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199932184 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.003.0008
Theory Comparison in Science and Religion

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In philosophy of religion two assumptions are often made. One is that in looking at how evidence affects a religion such as Christianity, we can look at how the evidence affects the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, all good, God, instead of how the evidence affects Christianity. The second assumption is that the evidence is objective, accessible by reason alone, and does not depend on our heart, affections, will, or individual experience. These assumptions are not made when we assess scientific theories or ordinary beliefs we hold, and I argue that these assumptions should be rejected. These assumptions are often made in relation to the problem of evil, and I use Liklihoodism to argue that if they are rejected, a rational theist need not think facts about evil are evidence against religious belief; on the contrary, a typical theist might even hold that it provides evidence against naturalism.

Keywords: philosophy; religion; Plantinga; probability; evidence; Likelhoodism; evil; rationality; heart

Chapter.  6912 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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