Chapter

Personal Identity and Prudence

Dennis McKerlie

in Justice Between the Young and the Old

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199769131
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199979615 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199769131.003.0006

Series: Oxford Ethics Series

Personal Identity and Prudence

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This chapter considers some further questions about the views defended in Chapters 4 and 5, arguing that applying principles of justice to temporal parts of lives does not depend on any particular theory of the nature of personal identity. For example, applying such principles does not depend on awarding a special ontological status to temporal parts of lives, or thinking that a person consists of a series of related selves. The chapter also argues that the application does not depend on there being a significant amount of psychological change over the lifetime of the person. It discusses the relationship between egalitarian priority and prudence, and it defends an implication of the positive view that we make priority judgments both inside lives and across different lives with the same degree of strength.

Keywords: justice; temporal parts of lives; egalitarian priority; positive view; priority judgements

Chapter.  9379 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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