Chapter

Kripke on the a Priori and the Necessary

Albert Casullo

in Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199777860
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933525 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777860.003.0001
Kripke on the a Priori and the Necessary

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Philosophers have traditionally believed that there is a close connection between the categories of a priori propositions and necessary propositions. One widely held thesis about the nature of this connection is that all a priori knowledge is of necessary propositions and that all necessary propositions are knowable a priori. Saul Kripke has recently argued that this traditional account is mistaken. In “Identity and Necessity” he argues that there are necessary a posteriori propositions, while in “Naming and Necessity” he argues, in addition to this, that there are contingent a priori propositions. The primary concern of this paper is to examine Kripke's arguments in order to determine whether he has succeeded in calling the traditional account into question.

Keywords: a priori; necessary; a posteriori; contingent; Kripke

Chapter.  3874 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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