Chapter

Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification

Albert Casullo

in Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199777860
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933525 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777860.003.0007
Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification

Show Summary Details

Preview

Radical empiricism is the view that experience is the only source of knowledge. Hence, radical empiricism deniess the existence of a priori knowledge. Its most famous proponents are John Stuart Mill and W. V. Quine. Although both reject a priori knowledge, they offer different empiricist accounts of the knowledge alleged by their opponents to be a priori. My primary concern in this paper is not with the cogency of their positive accounts. My focus is their arguments against a priori knowledge. My goal is to establish that although they offer very different arguments against the existence of a priori knowledge, each of their arguments suffers from a common defect. They both fail to appreciate the phenomenon of epistemic overdetermination and its role in the theory of knowledge.

Keywords: radical; empiricism; a priori; knowledge; justification; overdetermination; Mill; Quine

Chapter.  7845 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.