Chapter

Adaptive Preferences and Choice: Are Adaptive Preferences Autonomy Deficits?<sup>*</sup>

Serene J. Khader

in Adaptive Preferences and Women's Empowerment

Published in print September 2011 | ISBN: 9780199777884
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199919055 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777884.003.0003

Series: Studies in Feminist Philosophy

Adaptive Preferences and Choice: Are Adaptive Preferences Autonomy Deficits?*

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter contains the central arguments against conceiving adaptive preferences as autonomy deficits. Attempts to define adaptive preferences as procedural autonomy deficits—despite their intuitive appeal— yield conceptions of adaptive preference that are intuitively implausible, unsuited for use in development practice, and/or morally objectionable. If the problem with adaptive preferences is that they are unchosen, we should think that all unchosen preferences are worthy of public interrogation, but we do not. The chapter also briefly argues against conceiving adaptive preferences as substantive autonomy deficits. If we think of adaptive preferences as substantive autonomy deficits, we will recommend morally objectionable strategies for preference transformation

Keywords: adaptive preference; autonomy deficits; procedural autonomy; substantive autonomy

Chapter.  14520 words. 

Subjects: Feminist Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.