Chapter

Three Models of Epistemic Dependence

Benjamin McMyler

in Testimony, Trust, and Authority

Published in print September 2011 | ISBN: 9780199794331
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199914616 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794331.003.0004
Three Models of Epistemic Dependence

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This chapter distinguishes between three competing models for understanding the way in which, in believing something on the basis of testimony, an audience is epistemically dependent on a speaker and her testimony. According to the Evidential Model, the audience is epistemically dependent on the speaker for providing the audience with evidence; according to the Inheritance Model, the audience is epistemically dependent on the speaker for expressing a belief the justification of which can be inherited; and according to the Second-Personal Model, the audience is epistemically dependent on the speaker for assuming a kind of second-personal relationship towards the audience. Chapter 2 defended a version of the Second-Personal Model. This chapter examines what is at stake between the Second-Personal Model and the Evidential and Inheritance Models.

Keywords: testimony; justification; sincerity; trust; the second person

Chapter.  18844 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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