Chapter

The Agent as a Locus of Self-Explanation

Christopher Yeomans

in Freedom and Reflection

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199794522
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199919253 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.003.0005
The Agent as a Locus of Self-Explanation

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This chapter applies the results of chapter 4 to the problem raised in chapter 3. That is, it shows how the conception of explanation Hegel articulates in his Logic eliminates the infinite regresses that had seemed to plague the notion of self-determination or substantive free will. It focuses on the versions of the regress argument presented, in different ways, by Galen Strawson and G.E.M. Anscombe. The similarities between Hegel's view and Robert Nozick's conception of self-subsumption are then investigated in the light of arguments in the contemporary philosophy of action and Kant's Third Antinomy.

Keywords: Hegel; free will; Galen Strawson; G.E.M. Anscombe; Kant; infinite regress arguments

Chapter.  4643 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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