Characterizing Temporalism

Berit Brogaard

in Transient Truths

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780199796908
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933235 | DOI:
Characterizing Temporalism

Show Summary Details


Mark Richard (1981) calls the thesis that propositions never change their truth-values over time ‘eternalism’ and the opposing view ‘temporalism’. Temporalism is committed to the view that temporal contents, contents that may have different truth-values at different times, have full proposition status. They may be (i) the semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences, (ii) the objects of the attitudes (e.g. belief, doubt, hope, wish, and so on), (iii) the objects of agreement and disagreement, (iv) what is transferred or shared when people communicate successfully, and (v) the contents operated on by intensional operators (e.g., modal operators or tense operators). After offering more precise formulations of temporalism and eternalism, I argue that temporal contents are the semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences.

Keywords: truth-evaluable sentence; relativistic semantics; temporal content; semantic value; tense; truth conditions; incomplete propositions; the binding argument

Chapter.  8228 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.