Chapter

Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

Alvin I. Goldman

in Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780199812875
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933150 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0009
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

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This chapter discusses two distinct topics in social epistemology: epistemological relativism and peer disagreement. It characterizes epistemological relativism by treating it as a combination of three theses. It then proposes a novel version of relativism that may be appealing to firm objectivists. Next, it looks at the relativization proposal, which is supported by the notion of iterative justification. The chapter also gives provisional suggestions for applying these ideas to the peer disagreement problem.

Keywords: epistemological relativism; peer disagreement; relativization proposal; iterative justification

Chapter.  11410 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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