Treatment and Prevention

Norman Daniels

in Prevention vs. Treatment

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199837373
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199919499 | DOI:
Treatment and Prevention

Show Summary Details


Without focusing on the details of specific health systems, this chapter considers what we owe each other with regard to promoting and restoring health and what this means for the balance between prevention and treatment. I argue that we have robust obligations both with regard to prevention and treatment, though the specifics of what is owed depend on decisions about how to fit a reasonable array of such services within resource limits. Among our preventive obligations are interventions that provide incentives for adopting health regarding behaviors, though these are harder to justify on some accounts of justice than others. For example, luck egalitarianism provides no justification for such incentives, though a Rawlsian account does. The chapter concludes by considering whether the fact that risk is more concentrated in some people than others, say in identified victims rather than statistical ones, is morally relevant to giving them some priority. I claim that concentration of risk is morally relevant under some conditions and that this may favor identified over statistical victims to the extent that risk concentration is the relevant contrast between them.

Keywords: concentration of risk; moral relevance; luck egalitarianism; prevention; treatment; identified victims; statistical victims; incentives

Chapter.  8523 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.