Chapter

Moral Reasons and Practice

Mark Rowlands

in Can Animals Be Moral?

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199842001
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199979844 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.003.0008
Moral Reasons and Practice

Show Summary Details

Preview

There is another way of understanding normativity that does not depend on control. This may also be incompatible with the idea that animals can act for moral reasons. To be the subject of moral reasons requires that one belong to a moral practice. Two versions of the practice hypothesis are distinguished in this chapter. According to the first, belonging to a practice is a necessary condition of possessing reasons of any sort. It is argued that either this conception of practice is faulty, or there are no reasons for supposing that animals cannot belong to such a practice. According to the second conception, belonging to a practice is a necessary condition of possessing specifically moral reasons. This conception of practice is argued against on the grounds that it merely elaborates the untenable SCNM schema. There are, moreover, no reasons for thinking that animals cannot belong to a practice in this sense.

Keywords: practice; Wittgenstein; Dixon; reasons; normativity; content

Chapter.  7866 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.