Chapter

Perception, Self-Awareness, and Intentionality

Christian Coseru

in Perceiving Reality

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199843381
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199979851 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199843381.003.0008
Perception, Self-Awareness, and Intentionality

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The Buddhist epistemological analysis of ‘self-awareness’ underscores a conception of consciousness that takes into account not only its phenomenal content but also its phenomenal character. This chapter examines the extent to which recent work at the intersection of phenomenology and philosophy of mind, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, can be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist defense of reflexive awareness. It is also concerned with reflexivity more generally, and the ways in which the theoretical model of embodied and enactive cognition, can provide an explanatory framework for the Buddhist epistemological account of perception. Furthermore, it argues that in taking perception as intentionally constituted, the Buddhist epistemologists are not only in agreement with many Western philosophers, but also can contribute novel insights to our phenomenological understanding of intentionality.

Keywords: self-awareness; intentionality; body-schema; reflexivity; reflective awareness; non-positional consciousness; aspectual cognition; Brentano; Husserl; Kant

Chapter.  17993 words. 

Subjects: Buddhism

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