Chapter

Scanlon's Buck-Passing Account of Value

Richard Kraut

in Against Absolute Goodness

Published in print January 2012 | ISBN: 9780199844463
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199919550 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844463.003.0011

Series: Oxford Moral Theory

Scanlon's Buck-Passing Account of Value

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter discusses how this book's views accords with and departs from Scanlon's buck-passing approach to goodness and value in general. According to Scanlon, when a thing has value, its being valuable does not itself constitute a reason for valuing it. He holds that whenever something is valuable, it has some further feature that makes it so, and that further feature is what provides a reason in favor of valuing it, not the mere fact that it is valuable.

Keywords: goodness; value; good; Scanlon

Chapter.  3792 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.