Referring <i>De Re</i>

Tyler Burge

in Having in Mind

Published in print May 2012 | ISBN: 9780199844845
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933501 | DOI:
Referring De Re

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This chapter is a result of the author’s search for a characterization of de re phenomena that would center on individuals’ psychological capacities and that would include bases in both sensory capacities and capacities for understanding. It proposes the following thesis: A mental state or attitude is autonomously (and proleptically) de re with respect to a representational position in its representational content if and only if the representational position contains a representation that represents (purports to refer) nondescriptively, and is backed by an epistemic competence to make noninferential, immediate, nondiscursive attributions to the res. In sufficiently mature thinkers, exercise of this competence often constitutes knowledge. It can, however, reside in primitive, subpropositional perception or action, and in framework-setting de se markers in perception or action sets.

Keywords: de re phenomena; mental state; attitude; representation

Chapter.  7123 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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