Strategies Defined and Illustrated


in Schelling's Game Theory

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199857203
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199932597 | DOI:
Strategies Defined and Illustrated

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This chapter begins with a problem from Schelling's class, namely how to introduce strategic commitment, followed by an answer and an explanation. It outlines four strategies by Schelling that are at times used interchangeably: commitments, threats, warnings, and promises. To clarify the differences the reader is presented with a scenario with strategies to consider. Each strategy is defined and illustrated with a 2 × 2 matrix. A question shows a matrix and asks which strategy could be employed to change the payoff received and what would be gained, followed by a short explanation. The chapter ends with a review list of ten situations, most of which are taken from a Schelling assignment that are to be categorized as one of the four strategies. A supplement, “Will Chicken Out?” is about Schelling's advice to President Kennedy to make a commitment during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the result being a “chicken dilemma.” Following the column the chicken dilemma matrix is presented and explained.

Keywords: threats; promises; commitment; warnings; chicken dilemma

Chapter.  5768 words. 

Subjects: Economics

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