Collective Choice and Voting


in Schelling's Game Theory

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199857203
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199932597 | DOI:
Collective Choice and Voting

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This chapter begins with a brief voting discussion and then presents a problem and explanation from Schelling's course. It looks at sincere and strategic voting, the idea of a secret ballot, selling votes, and various characteristics involved in voting systems. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem describes Arrow's proof that no system could achieve four reasonable election goals. “Designing voting schemes” presents a Schelling problem where results depend on the voting strategy applied. The idea of cyclical choices concerns several options where preferences among them vary. Voting trees are introduced for strategic choices. The Condorcet option contends when there are several choices, any voting system selected should choose what the majority would choose if compared with another. In the positive majority sequential voting scheme, the first candidate is paired against the second and the winner is paired against the third, and so on. That leads to the idea of efficient voting outcomes, where no alternative outcome is unanimously preferred to the actual results. Lastly, the chapter considers the median voter theorem when voters are spread across a broad conservative-liberal continuum. This holds the candidate that wins the voter at the median wins the election. Supplementing the chapter is an article by Thomas L. Friedman “Hoping for Arab Mandelas.”

Keywords: sincere choice; Arrow's Impossibility Theorem; Condorcet option; median voter theorem; voting schemes; strategic voting

Chapter.  8196 words. 

Subjects: Economics

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