The Relation of Logic to Ontology in Hegel

Paul Redding

in Categories of Being

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199890576
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199980031 | DOI:
The Relation of Logic to Ontology in Hegel

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Since Russell it has been commonly accepted that Hegel’s metaphysics had been irretrievably compromised by the logic that it had presupposed: the traditional term-based syllogistic as transmitted by Leibniz. Recently, however, this view has been challenged by interpretations that regard Hegel’s logic as a development of Kant’s “transcendental logic” which attempted to derive the ontological form of the world from the form of our finite judgments about it. This chapter argues that, in the spirit of Kant, Hegel had attempted to extend the scope of Kant’s reversal of explanatory direction to metaphysical assumptions seen as limiting Kant’s own attempts. The result for Hegel was a reconstruction of transcendental logic and its relation to ontology in which important Aristotelian features were retained. Many of the features of Hegel’s logic can be seen to result from his attempts to make explicit, and then resolve, an ambiguity between term- and proposition-based logics.

Keywords: Hegel; Kant; Aristotle; idealism; transcendental logic; ontology

Chapter.  10377 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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