Chapter

Testing the Unified Theory of Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives

Kristin Kanthak and George A. Krause

in The Diversity Paradox

Published in print June 2012 | ISBN: 9780199891726
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933433 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199891726.003.0004
Testing the Unified Theory of Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter provides an empirical test of the formal model derived in the previous chapter, drawing on methods from the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) tradition. The dependent variable is member-to-member campaign contributions from legislators’ leadership PACs, which are PACs created for the sole purpose of channeling campaign contributions to other legislators. Although these contributions exist largely for electoral reasons, controlling for those reasons provides a measure of colleague valuation. The chapter describes a double-hurdle regression model, which is a generalization of the Tobit model that allows coefficients from the first and second stage to vary. The results show that as expected from the unified theory of colleague valuation, men devalue women more as the proportion of women increases. Contrary to the theory, women also devalue women as their proportion increases, a problem called asymmetric tokenism, which is addressed in more detail in the chapter that follows.

Keywords: colleague valuation; tokenism; Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM); double-hurdle regression model; member-to-member campaign contributions; leadership PACs; U.S. House of Representatives; asymmetric tokenism

Chapter.  11541 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: US Politics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.