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This chapter sketches a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light on how the occurrence of core weak-willed actions may be accounted for, if they occur. On the theoretical side, the framework is supported by the defense of positions on the conceptual connection between better judgments and intentions and on the nature of practical evaluative reasoning. On the empirical side, the framework benefits from work in developmental and social psychology on delay of gratification—especially work by Walter Mischel and colleagues. The chapter applies the framework to an apparent case of core weak-willed action. A question about the featured agent’s prospects for a successful exercise of self-control in that case sets the stage for chapter 5.
Keywords: better judgment; core weak-willed action; delay of gratification; intention; practical reasoning; self-control
Chapter. 10727 words.
Subjects: philosophy of mind
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