Chapter

Active Ignorance, Epistemic Others, and Epistemic Friction

José Medina

in The Epistemology of Resistance

Published in print February 2013 | ISBN: 9780199929023
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199301522 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199929023.003.0001

Series: Studies in Feminist Philosophy

Active Ignorance, Epistemic Others, and Epistemic Friction

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Focusing on racial and sexual oppression and their interrelation, chapter 1 provides an analysis of active ignorance and of three epistemic vices that support it: epistemic arrogance, laziness, and closed-mindedness. I argue that structural active ignorance can be corrected only by developing epistemic virtues such as epistemic humility, curiosity/diligence, and open-mindedness. I further argue that the overcoming of active ignorance requires beneficial epistemic friction in interactions with significantly different epistemic others, and I offer two regulative principles for achieving such friction: the principle of acknowledgment and engagement, and the principle of epistemic equilibrium.

Keywords: active ignorance; epistemic virtues and vices; resistance; acknowledgment; epistemic engagement; epistemic equilibrium

Chapter.  14140 words. 

Subjects: Feminist Philosophy

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