Chapter

The Rejection of Epistemic Authority

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

in Epistemic Authority

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199936472
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199980697 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.003.0002
The Rejection of Epistemic Authority

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This chapter investigates the historical sources of resistance to epistemic authority in the history of philosophy. The chapter focuses on the value of epistemic self-reliance and argues that a defense of self-reliance from Plato, Descartes, Locke, or Kant is problematic and probably based on a misreading of those philosophers. If epistemic self-reliance is a good, it is not because of the untrustworthiness of others or the demands of Kantian autonomy. This chapter is a prolegomenon to an extended argument against epistemic self-reliance in later chapters.

Keywords: authority; egalitarianism; self-reliance; autonomy; Descartes; Locke; Plato; Kant

Chapter.  11298 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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