Chapter

Trust and Epistemic Authority

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

in Epistemic Authority

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199936472
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199980697 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.003.0006
Trust and Epistemic Authority

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This chapter argues that among those whom we are committed to trusting epistemically by a consistent exercise of conscientious self-trust are some who satisfy principles of authority modeled on the well-known principles of authority defended by Joseph Raz. The basic idea is that epistemic authority is justified by my conscientious judgment that I am more likely to form a true belief (or a belief that will satisfy conscientious self-reflection) if I believe what the authority believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself. This principle shows that the value of getting the truth can conflict with the value of self-reliance.

Keywords: Joseph Raz; authority; autonomy; belief; trust; justification; value of knowledge; conscientiousness

Chapter.  9601 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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