Religious Authority

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

in Epistemic Authority

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199936472
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199980697 | DOI:
Religious Authority

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This chapter applies the argument of Chapter Three again epistemic egoism to the domain of religious belief. Religious epistemic egoism must be rejected by a conscientious person. The form of common consent arguments that was defended in Chapter Three permits us to defend a version of the Consensus Gentium argument for theism. The chapter then defends epistemic authority in the domain of religious belief by applying the principles of authoritative testimony of Chapter Six. The chapter considers three models of revelation as divine testimony, and argue that the rationality of faith can be explained by my account of first person, deliberative reasons for belief.

Keywords: religious authority; religious epistemic egoism; religious epistemic universalism; consensus gentium argument; revelation; faith; conscientiousness

Chapter.  9631 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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