Chapter

Trust and Disagreement

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

in Epistemic Authority

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199936472
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199980697 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.003.0011
Trust and Disagreement

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This chapter argues that since self-trust commits us to trust in others (Chap 3), the problem of disagreement with others who have the properties we trust in ourselves is a conflict within self-trust. The argument of Chapter 2 on the resolution of dissonance within the self applies to the problem of disagreement with others, and resolving disagreement in favor of one's community can be supported by principles of conscientious reflection from Chapter 6. But the problem of reasonable disagreement reappears as the problem of reasonable disagreement between communities. The chapter argues that communal epistemic egoism is unsupportable for reasons that parallel my argument against epistemic egoism in Chapter 3. The chapter concludes with principles of rational dialogue between communities that follow from conscientious communal reflection.

Keywords: disagreement; testimony; Kant; antinomies; dissonance; scepticism; self-trust

Chapter.  10603 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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