Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt

John Martin Fischer

in Deep Control

Published in print January 2012 | ISBN: 9780199742981
Published online May 2015 | e-ISBN: 9780190267537 | DOI:
Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt

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This chapter discusses Kadri Vihvelin's critique of Harry Frankfurt's compatibilism of causal determinism and moral responsibility. It begins by giving an overview of the structure of the argument, and presents a reply to the critique. Vihvelin argues that the supporters of Frankfurt's idea are all missing some basic logical facts, and she presents her argument by drawing a distinction between “two ways of getting someone to do what you want.” However, there are reasonable arguments that will prove that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities. The chapter concludes that there is no basic logical fallacy in arguing Frankfurt cases. Although the agent in question acts freely and is morally responsible, the agent lacks the relevant sort of access to alternative possibilities.

Keywords: Kadri Vihvelin; Harry Frankfurt; causal determinism; moral responsibility; alternative possibilities

Chapter.  6627 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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