Journal Article

Means-ends epistemology

O Schulte

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 50, issue 1, pages 1-31
Published in print March 1999 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online March 1999 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.1.1
Means-ends epistemology

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This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Riddle of Induction illustrate the power of this approach. The paper establishes a hierarchy of means-ends notions of empirical success, and discusses a number of issues, results and applications of means-ends epistemology.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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