Journal Article

Holes, Haecceitism and two conceptions of determinism

J Melia

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 50, issue 4, pages 639-664
Published in print December 1999 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online December 1999 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.4.639
Holes, Haecceitism and two conceptions of determinism

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In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this conception also turns out to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, I search for a conception of determinism that is both independently plausible and capable of blocking the hole argument.

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Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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