Journal Article

The Search Hypothesis of Emotion

Dylan Evans

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 53, issue 4, pages 497-509
Published in print December 2002 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online December 2002 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/53.4.497
The Search Hypothesis of Emotion

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Many philosophers and psychologists now argue that emotions play a vital role in reasoning. This paper explores one particular way of elucidating how emotions help reason which may be dubbed ‘the search hypothesis of emotion’. After outlining the search hypothesis of emotion and dispensing with a red herring that has marred previous statements of the hypothesis, I discuss two alternative readings of the search hypothesis. It is argued that the search hypothesis must be construed as an account of what emotions typically do, rather than as a definition of emotion. Even as an account of what emotions typically do, the search hypothesis can only be evaluated in the context of a specific theory of what emotions are.

1 Introduction

2 The search hypothesis of emotion

3 A red herring: the frame problem

4 The search problem

5 Two readings of the search hypothesis

6 Two final remarks

7 Conclusion

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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