Journal Article

Harold Jeffreys' Probabilistic Epistemology: Between Logicism And Subjectivism

Maria Carla Galavotti

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 54, issue 1, pages 43-57
Published in print March 2003 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online March 2003 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/54.1.43
Harold Jeffreys' Probabilistic Epistemology: Between Logicism And Subjectivism

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Harold Jeffreys' ideas on the interpretation of probability and epistemology are reviewed. It is argued that with regard to the interpretation of probability, Jeffreys embraces a version of logicism that shares some features of the subjectivism of Ramsey and de Finetti. Jeffreys also developed a probabilistic epistemology, characterized by a pragmatical and constructivist attitude towards notions such as ‘objectivity’, ‘reality’ and ‘causality’.

1 Introductory remarks

2 The interpretation of probability

3 Jeffreys' probabilistic epistemology

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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