Journal Article

The Place of Time in Cognition

Daniel A. Weiskopf

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 55, issue 1, pages 87-105
Published in print March 2004 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online March 2004 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.1.87
The Place of Time in Cognition

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Dynamical systems theorists (dynamicists) allege that symbolic models of cognition are essentially incomplete because they fail to capture the temporal properties of mental processing. I present two possible interpretations of the dynamicists' argument from time and show that neither one is successful. The disagreement between dynamicists and symbolic theorists rests not on temporal considerations per se, but on differences over the multiple realizability of cognitive states and the proper explanatory goals of psychology. The negative arguments of dynamicists against symbolic models fail, and it is doubtful whether pursuing dynamicists' explanatory goals will lead to a robust psychological theory.

Introduction

Elements of the symbolic theory

Elements of dynamical systems theory

The argument from time

4.1 First interpretation of the argument from time

4.2 Second interpretation of the argument from time

Limits of dynamical systems theory

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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