Journal Article

Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence

Steven Gimbel

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 55, issue 2, pages 269-285
Published in print June 2004 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online June 2004 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.2.269
Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence

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In The Book of Evidence, Peter Achinstein argues against the long-standing claim that ‘evidence’ is ambiguous in possessing a sense of confirming evidence and a sense of supporting evidence. He argues that explications of supporting evidence will necessarily violate his contentions that evidence is a discontinuous ‘threshold concept’ and that any philosophical account of supporting evidence will be too weak to be useful to working scientists. But an account of supporting evidence may be formulated which includes Achinstein's notion of epistemic thresholds that finds examples in Achinstein's own historical case studies.

Thresholds and the denial of ambiguity

Achinstein's new account of confirming evidence

Achinstein's argument against the ‘ambiguity response’

A threshold-based approach for restoring the ambiguity

Maxwell and ‘a subject of rational curiosity’

Bohr and ‘future development of our understanding’

Perrin and the edge of reasonable belief

Restoring ambiguity

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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