Journal Article

Tracking the Real: Through Thick and Thin

Stathis Psillos

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 55, issue 3, pages 393-409
Published in print September 2004 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online September 2004 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.3.393
Tracking the Real: Through Thick and Thin

More Like This

Show all results sharing these subjects:

  • Philosophy of Science
  • Science and Mathematics

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can accommodate thick epistemic access as a bonus. Finally, I try to defend the Quinean theoretical virtues against some of Azzouni's objections.

Introduction

Theoretical irrealism vs holistic realism

On the epistemic authority of observation

The myth of the levels

Quinean virtues

Conclusion

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.