Journal Article

Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution

Peter B. M. Vranas

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 55, issue 3, pages 545-560
Published in print September 2004 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online September 2004 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.3.545
Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution

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According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians.

Introduction

Hempel's paradox, the standard Bayesian solution, and the disputed assumption

Attempts to defend the disputed assumption

Attempts to refute the disputed assumption

A way out for Bayesians

Conclusion

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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