Journal Article

Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and van Fraassen

James Ladyman

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 55, issue 4, pages 755-765
Published in print December 2004 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online December 2004 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.4.755
Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and van Fraassen

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In this journal [2000], I argued that Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism was undermined in various ways by his antirealism about modality. Here I offer some comments and responses to the reply to my arguments by Bradley Monton and van Fraassen [2003]. In particular, after making some minor points, I argue that Monton and van Fraassen have not done enough to show that the context dependence of counterfactuals renders their truth conditions non-objective, and I also argue that adopting modal realism does after all undermine the motivation for constructive empiricism.

Introduction

Underdetermination and epistemic modesty

Counterfactual observations

Modal realism and constructive empiricism

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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