Journal Article

The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman

Michael Strevens

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 56, issue 4, pages 913-918
Published in print December 2005 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online September 2005 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi133
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman

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Fitelson and Waterman's ([2005]) principal objection to Strevens's ([2001]) Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim.

The project

Clarifications

The negligibility argument

Generalization and proof

Journal Article.  2120 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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