Journal Article

Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

Branden Fitelson and Andrew Waterman

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 58, issue 2, pages 333-338
Published in print June 2007 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online May 2007 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axm012
Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

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By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD. 1

Strevens's ‘clarifications’

2

Strevens's new-and-improved ‘negligibility arguments’

Journal Article.  1771 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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