Journal Article

Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality

Paul Dicken

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 58, issue 3, pages 605-612
Published in print September 2007 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online June 2007 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axm020
Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality

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James Ladyman ([2000]) argues that constructive empiricism is untenable because it cannot adequately account for modal statements about observability. In this paper, I attempt to resist Ladyman's conclusion, arguing that the constructive empiricist can grant his modal discourse objective, theory-independent truth-conditions, yet without compromising his empiricism. 1

Ladyman's dilemma

2

Constructive empiricism and modal agnosticism

3

Conclusion

Journal Article.  2874 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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