Journal Article

What Evidence Do You Have?

Ram Neta

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 59, issue 1, pages 89-119
Published in print March 2008 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online March 2008 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn003
What Evidence Do You Have?

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Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that various proposed accounts of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set cannot answer this question. I then propose an alternative account of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set. 1

Introduction

2

The elements of one's evidence set are propositions

3

Which kinds of propositions are in one's evidence set?

3.1

Doxastic accounts of evidence

3.2

Non-doxastic accounts of evidence

4

Elaborating and defending the LIE

Journal Article.  15042 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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