Journal Article

Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]

Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa and Tommaso Mastropasqua

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 59, issue 2, pages 201-211
Published in print June 2008 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online June 2008 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn008
Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]

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Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.

Introduction

Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation

Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: Test Cases and Basic Principles

Journal Article.  3261 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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