Journal Article

Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality

Jennifer Nado

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 59, issue 4, pages 709-731
Published in print December 2008 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online December 2008 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn035
Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality

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Several recent articles on the concept of intentional action center on experimental findings suggesting that intentionality ascription can be affected by moral factors. I argue that the explanation for these phenomena lies in the workings of a tacit moral judgment mechanism, capable under certain circumstances of altering normal intentionality ascriptions. This view contrasts with that of Knobe ([2006]), who argues that the findings show that the concept of intentional action invokes evaluative notions. I discuss and reject possible objections to the moral mechanism view, and offer arguments supporting the model over Knobe's account on grounds of simplicity and plausibility.

Introduction

The Competence Hypothesis

The Performance Response

Moral Mechanism Interference

Blame or Valence?

Journal Article.  10205 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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