Journal Article

Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence

Gregory Wheeler

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 63, issue 4, pages 841-850
Published in print December 2012 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online February 2012 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr048
Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence

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Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.

1Formal Preliminaries

2A Definition without a Procedure

3Independence and Epistemic Relevance

4Conclusion

Journal Article.  3410 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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