Journal Article

Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong

Hannes Leitgeb

in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Published on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Volume 64, issue 1, pages 61-68
Published in print March 2013 | ISSN: 0007-0882
Published online April 2012 | e-ISSN: 1464-3537 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr058
Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong

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We show that finitely axiomatized first-order theories that involve some criterion of identity for entities of a category C can be reformulated as conjunctions of a non-triviality statement and a criterion of identity for entities of category C again. From this, we draw two conclusions: First, criteria of identity can be very strong deductively. Second, although the criteria of identity that are constructed in the proof of the theorem are not good ones intuitively, it is difficult to say what exactly is wrong with them once the modern metaphysical view of identity criteria is presupposed.

1Criteria of Identity: Strong …

2… and Wrong

Journal Article.  2866 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Science ; Science and Mathematics

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