Journal Article

Corporate Governance, Pay Equity, and the Limitations of Agency Theory

Marc T. Moore

in Current Legal Problems

Volume 68, issue 1, pages 431-464
Published in print January 2015 | ISSN: 0070-1998
Published online June 2015 | e-ISSN: 2044-8422 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/clp/cuv002
Corporate Governance, Pay Equity, and the Limitations of Agency Theory

More Like This

Show all results sharing these subjects:

  • Law
  • Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
  • Law and Society
  • Politics and Law

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

It is well known that recent decades have seen an explosion in levels of senior executive remuneration in public companies, both in absolute and in relative terms to ordinary worker pay. However, a conspicuous corresponding trend over recent years has been the development of a range of countervailing regulatory tools designed to mitigate this disparity within various national environments. These include regulatory pay ratio caps, bonus bans, and mandatory pay ratio disclosures. Notwithstanding these salient developments, prevailing legal and economic debates on senior executive and worker pay remain rooted in the dominant principal–agent paradigm of corporate governance, which consistently disputes the relevance of equitable or distributive fairness concerns to the essentially functional challenge of determining effective agent incentives. In this article, I take issue with the orthodox principal–agent perspective on pay equity, by demonstrating the centrality of equitable concerns to effective agent-incentive design, both at senior executive and ordinary worker levels.

Journal Article.  14251 words. 

Subjects: Law ; Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law ; Law and Society ; Politics and Law

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.