Journal Article

Institutional designs to face the dark side of total allowable catches

Ikerne del Valle and Kepa Astorkiza

in ICES Journal of Marine Science

Published on behalf of ICES/CIEM

Volume 64, issue 4, pages 851-857
Published in print May 2007 | ISSN: 1054-3139
Published online May 2007 | e-ISSN: 1095-9289 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsm060
Institutional designs to face the dark side of total allowable catches

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del Valle, I., and Astorkiza, K. 2007. Institutional designs to face the dark side of total allowable catches. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64: 851–857.

Setting total allowable catches (TACs) is an endogenous process in which different agents and institutions, often with conflicting interests and opportunistic behaviour, try to influence policy-makers. Far from being the benevolent social planners many would wish them to be, these policy-makers may also pursue self-interest when making final decisions. Although restricted knowledge of stock abundance and population dynamics, and weakness in enforcement, have effects, these other factors may explain why TAC management has failed to guarantee sustainable exploitation of fish resources. Rejecting the exogeneity of the TAC and taking advantage of fruitful debate on economic policy (i.e. the rules vs. discretion debate, and that surrounding the independence of central banks), two institutional developments are analysed as potential mechanisms to face up to misconceptions about TACs: long-term harvest control rules and a central bank of fish.

Keywords: central bank of fish; decision framework; discretion; harvest control rule; institutions; rules; TAC

Journal Article.  5487 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Environmental Science ; Marine and Estuarine Biology

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