Journal Article

THE DETERRENT AND ENUNCIATING EFFECTS OF CONSENT DECREES

Giovanna Massarotto

in Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Volume 11, issue 2, pages 493-499
Published in print June 2015 | ISSN: 1744-6414
Published online April 2015 | e-ISSN: 1744-6422 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhv008
THE DETERRENT AND ENUNCIATING EFFECTS OF CONSENT DECREES

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  • Technological Change; Research and Development
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More than 90 percent of U.S. civil antitrust cases settle by consent decrees. This phenomenon raises two questions. First, do consent decrees sacrifice antitrust deterrence, given that no finding of liability is made and no fine imposed? Second, do consent decrees sacrifice the public good of adjudication to say what the law is? A comparison of the Intel investigations in Europe and the United States shows that consent decrees need not sacrifice deterrence. However, the current European approach to consent decrees, unlike the U.S. approach, does sacrifice the benefit of having courts explain the content of competition law.

Keywords: D4; D42; K21; L11; L12; L41; L86; O34

Journal Article.  2959 words. 

Subjects: Technological Change; Research and Development ; Antitrust Issues and Policies ; Services ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; Market Structure and Pricing

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