Chapter

Against the belief model of delusion

Andy Hamilton

in Reconceiving Schizophrenia

Published on behalf of Oxford University Press

Published in print November 2006 | ISBN: 9780198526131
Published online February 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191754340 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780198526131.003.0011

Series: International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry

Against the belief model of delusion

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The central aim this article is to criticise the received opinion that delusions are beliefs. I will argue that in many psychotic and non-psychotic cases, the basic level of description of delusion falls short of the ascription of belief. In monothematic, behaviourally inert cases at least, I maintain that although the delusion shares some features of belief, the disanalogies are sufficient to justify withholding a clear belief-attribution. My thesis is not quite that in many cases delusions are not beliefs; rather, it is that there is no fact of the matter concerning whether S believes that p.

Chapter.  8394 words. 

Subjects: Psychiatry

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