Chapter

Sense of self in schizophrenia

Paul H. Lysaker and John T. Lysaker

in Schizophrenia and the Fate of the Self

Published on behalf of Oxford University Press

Published in print August 2008 | ISBN: 9780199215768
Published online February 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191754524 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199215768.003.003

Series: International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry

Sense of self in schizophrenia

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At the end of Chapter 1, we suggested that even the most thorough third-person accounts fail to fully portray the phenomenon of schizophrenia. Not that objective symptoms, cortical dysfunction, neurocognitive compromise, or social injustice are of marginal interest for the study of schizophrenia. Rather, any explanation which ignores the first-person dimensions of the illness limits our understanding of it and, perhaps, our ability to treat it. While we will refine our conception of the first-person in Chapter 3, for now, the concept stands to remind us that human beings are creatures who experience events even as they strive to respond productively to those events. Our claim, then, is that alongside symptoms and their causes, one must track and engage sense of self among those with schizophrenia, for its fate is integral to the illness.

Chapter.  7798 words. 

Subjects: Psychiatry

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